
Vol. 1, N° 2, Summer 1994 EC COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER PAGE 19
In August 1991 the Swedish management of STORA
informed the Commission that it accepted that several
companies in the group had been involved in a serious
infringement of Article 85. STORA had recently taken over
the German producer FELDMUEHLE which had been a
ringleader of the cartel. After further information was
provided by STORA, the Commission issued a detailed
statement of objections in December 1992 addressed to some
23 undertakings. An oral hearing was held in June 1993.
Some half of the firms involved did not deny the essential
facts alleged against them.
Others however consisted to insist against all the weight of
the evidence that the meetings had been no more than "social
occasions".
THE PRODUCERS
: (see Table)
THE CARTEL
The Commission's investigations uncovered a highly
formalised structure of collaboration between virtually all the
suppliers of cartonboard in Western Europe. Under the cover
of an ostensibly legitimate trade association known as the
"Product Group Paperboard" and formally under the umbrella
of the European Paper Institute or EPI (which is not itself
involved), the participants had in fact set up an elaborate and
institutionalised price fixing and market sharing cartel.
The PG Paperboard had been set up in 1981 and had
attempted to regulate the market for several years but in
1986 following a reorganisation of its structures the cartel
began to operate more successfully.
The main cartel structures (besides a formal "General
Assembly" which did not conduct cartel business) were :
- A "President Working Group" (PWG) of Managing or
Commercial Directors which acted as the directory of the
Cartel and took the major strategic decisions : this
consisted of Cascades; Finnboard; KNP (up to 1988),
MAYR-MELNHOF, THAMES BOARD (later part of
MoDo); SARRIO; two STORA companies (including
FELDMUEHLE) and WEIG (from 1988). It met five or
six times a year.
- A President Conference (consisting of all producers) to
which the PWG reported;
- A "Joint Marketing Committee" (JMC) of marketing
manager level also grouping all the producers (except
Enso-Gutzeit) which prepared and briefed the PWG,
executed its directives and met once a month;
- An Economic Committee (most producers).
Cartel meetings were usually held in luxury hotels in Zurich.
A Swiss fiduciary company, FIDES, not only conducted the
information exchange system by which the operation of the
cartel was monitored and policed but also provided the cartel
secretariat in meetings.
THE OPERATION OF THE CARTEL
The key to the success of the cartel was achieving a balance
between supply and demand which would enable the
concerted "price initiatives" to go through. This was done
by agreeing a joint policy of so called "price before tonnage"
in 1987 to which all (and particularly the leading) producers
adhered. This arrangement was designed to accomodate the
conflicting ambitions of the EFTA and the Community
producers. In effect, the main producers reached a
consensus on their respective market share : they all realized
that aggressive attempts to gain market share would
undermine their carefully orchestrated price initiatives.
Firms which were suspected of deviating from the plan were
required to explain themselves to the others and pressure was
put on any perceived laggard to put up its prices to the
agreed levels.
By comparing the state of their respective order books the
producers were able to judge from the state of the market
when it was opportune to introduce a price initiative.
A machinery was also set up for the major producers to
concert on "downtime" (planned temporary plant stoppages)
so as to avoid excessive production.
The "price initiatives" which took place every six months
were planned and programmed in advance in the most
explicit detail. The idea was to achieve a uniform
pan-European price system. After it had been decided how
much the market would bear, a table of the increases for
each grade and in each national currency was drawn up.
These increases were then "announced" to customers and in
the trade press. A particularly disturbing feature of this
cartel was that, in order to disguise the concerted increases
as natural "price leadership", the producers also decided the
scenario in advance : who would be first to "announce" and
on what date, and the precise order and dates on which each
of the others would purport to "follow". The order was
varied each time with different producers taking turns to be
the price leader.
One document (from a JMC meeting of 6 September 1990)
obtained by the Commission is typical :
"
Price" increase will be announced next week in September
F FF 40 (100 kg) NL HFL 14
D DM 12 I Lit 80 (kg)
B BF 2,50 (kg) CH SF 9
GB # 40 (tonne) IRL # 45
All grades should be increased equally.
Only 1 price increase a year.
For deliveries from 7 January.
Not later than 31 January.
14 September letter with price increase (Mayr-Melnhof).
19 September Feldmuehle sending its letter.
Cascades before end of September.
All must have sent out their letters before 8 October.
"
The private notes of a number of JMC meetings discovered by
the Commission inspectors at several different undertakings
(notably Mayr-Melnhof's German subsidiary FS-Karton in
Neuss) were made contrary to a general understanding
among the cartel members that no incriminating evidence was
to be kept. Besides the elaborate orchestration of price
increases (to make them look like the natural operation of the
market), the measures of concealment taken by the producers
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