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PAGE 34 EC COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER Vol. 1, N° 2, Summer 1994
The second case of particular interest involved Procter &
Gamble GmbH (P&G), a wholly owned subsidiary of Procter
& Gamble company, and Vereinigte
Papierwerke
Schickedanz AG (VPS), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Gustav and Grete Schickedanz Holding KG (GGS).
The merger agreement provided for the acquisition by P&G
of the entire share capital of VPS from GGS.
The Commission did not consider that the merger raised any
competition concerns in the household tissue, cotton
products, adult incontinence products, pantliners and
cosmetics sectors, while P&G, itself, recognising the
competition problems its acquisition of VPS could cause in
the market for baby nappies, included an undertaking to
divest VPS' nappy business in the notified agreements.
In respect of sanitary towels, the Commission considered that
the combination of P&G's brand Always and the VPS brand
Camelia, would give rise to competition problems on the
German and Spanish markets.
P&G would have acquired about two-thirds by value of the
German market, while slightly increasing its already
dominant share in Spain.
The Commission decided to carry out an in depth
investigation, and consulted outside experts to assist in the
assessment of the complex and sometimes contradictory
evidence submitted to it. As a result, the Commission
concluded that there were separate markets for tampons and
towels. Consumer behaviour being significantly influenced
by factors other than price, such as performance and brand
familiarity. Consumer preferences seem to be based on
complex cultural, psychological and physical influences and
motivations. As for geographic markets, the Commission
considered Germany and Spain as national markets.
These markets for towels display high barriers to entry.
Furthermore, P&G's existing dominant position would have
been reinforced because of the loss of the brand Camelia as
a potential vehicle for entering the Spanish market. The
concentration as notified would thus create a dominant
position for P&G on the German market for sanitary towels
and would strengthen its position on the Spanish market. The
Commission considered that in the light of the characteristics
of the market, P&G's position was unlikely to be constrained
either by customers or competitors.
At a very late stage in the procedure, P&G offered to divest
the Camelia-branded feminine hygiene business of VPS.
The Commission agreed with P&G that this undertaking
would be carried out within a limited period after the
acquisition of VPS and that an independent trustee would be
appointed to supervise the sale, ensure that Camelia's
management remains independent and safeguard the
continued viability and market value of the business.
This allowed the Commission to declare the deal compatible
with the common market and the functioning of the EEA
agreement.
The last case which is interesting to follow (the merger was
notified on 6 June 1994), concerns Bertelsmann
AG,
Deutsche Bundespost Telekom (Telekom) and Taurus
Beteilingungs GmbH (Taurus), a company of the Kirch-
group (Kirch). They propose to
create a joint venture called MSG Media Service GmbH
(MSG).
The concentration affects the market for technical and
administrative services for pay-TV and other TV services
financed through subscription or payment by viewers.
This case is presently under investigation by the Merger
Task Force and it is therefore premature to enter into its
merits or to give any details.
What is interesting at this stage, is the fact that a public
telecommunications operator, holding a monopoly for
telephone network services and owning nearly the totality of
TV-cable networks in a Member State would combine its
future activities in the JV's market with those of the leading
pay TV suppliers.
We will come back to this case in one of the next issues of
this Newsletter.
II. Follow-up to 1993 Report on application of the
Merger Regulation
The Commission has launched a wide-ranging public
consultation procedure (see OJ C181/7 2.7.94) on certain
draft legislative and interpretive texts relating to the
implementation of the Merger Regulation. These measures
follow on from last year's Commission Report to the Council
on this subject in which the Commission promised a series
of measures designed to increase the efficiency and
transparency of the Merger Regulation in advance of any
formal revision of the Regulation itself.
In particular, the Commission undertook in this report to
lighten the notification requirements for joint ventures with
a minor impact inside the Community. Responding to this
commitment, therefore, the Commission proposes to
incorporate provision for a short-form notification
requirement in a new Form CO
annexed to the Implementing
Regulation (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2367/90).
The new form also proposes certain other changes which are
designed to meet the working requirements and procedures
applied by the Commission without significantly increasing
the reporting burden on notifying parties.
At the same time certain revisions are proposed to the
Implementing Regulation
itself in order to clarify ambiguities
in the current text and to improve procedures generally.
A second commitment undertaken by the Commission in its
report was to carry out a revision
of the notice on the
distinction between cooperative and concentrative joint
ventures. The Commission's practice on this difficult
jurisdictional issue has developed considerably since the
Merger Regulation came into effect. The purpose of the
proposed new notice is threefold: to take account of the
Commission's case-law; to clarify the principles the
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